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Abstract 
Rod Duclos: Charitable Giving: How Ego-Threats Impact Donations of Time and Money 
(Under the direction of Gary Armstrong, Jim Bettman, Paul Bloom, Charlotte Mason, and 
Gal Zauberman) 
 
Consumers can exhibit charitableness in a variety of ways, e.g., by reading to the 
blind, serving food to the hungry, donating money to the needy, etc. Broadly speaking, 
however, donation behavior can take one of two forms: One can volunteer time or money. 
Across four experiments, we examine how and why ego-threats, i.e., menaces to one‟s sense 
of self and identity, can help foster charitable behavior and lead consumers to prefer donating 
time over money to their favorite charities. We conclude by discussing the implications of 
our findings for theory and practice.  
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1. Introduction 
Consumers can exhibit charitableness in a variety of ways, e.g., by reading to the 
blind, serving food to the hungry, donating money to the needy, etc. Broadly speaking, 
however, donation behavior can take one of two forms: One can volunteer time or money. 
Collectively, Americans donate $260 billion a year to charities (American Association of 
Fundraising Counsel 2006) and volunteer an additional 15.5 billion hours of work 
(Independent Sector 2001). Together these time and monetary contributions amount to nearly 
half a trillion dollars a year (AAFC 2006; IS 2001). The spectrum of causes served is wide. 
Animals, the arts, education, public health, the environment: all have organizations and 
people working to promote their condition and protect their interests. But despite the 
amplitude of these numbers and the pervasiveness of donation behaviors, the determinants of 
charitable giving are not well understood (Kottasz 2004). And even less understood are the 
factors influencing one‟s decision to donate time versus money (Reed, Aquino, & Levy 
2007a). Yet, considering that some nonprofits rely predominantly on the time donated by 
volunteers to fulfill their mission (e.g., Meals on Wheels, Habitat for Humanity, Big Brothers 
Big Sisters) while others do so thanks to generous financial contributions by consumers (e.g., 
The Christian Children's Fund, The Wildlife Conservation Society, The Mayo Clinic), it 
seems that identifying the factors influencing donor orientation between volunteerism and 
financial philanthropy would constitute an important marketing issue. Indeed, with a better 
understanding of donor psychology, charitable organizations may be able to design better 
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communication campaigns and retention programs for their donors and volunteers, two of the 
most critical challenges nonprofits face today (West 2004). 
From a theory perspective, too, gaining a better understanding of the psychological 
processes underlying consumers‟ decisions between these two forms of donation behavior 
would enrich the current state of the literature. Indeed, while much work in economics has 
focused on financial philanthropy (Andreoni 2004; Harbaugh 1998a, 1998b), and even more 
work in psychology and sociology has examined volunteerism (Clary et al. 1998; Houle, 
Sagarin, & Kaplan 2005; Wilson & Musick 1997; Wilson 2000), only two papers, to date, 
have attempted to look at both time and money simultaneously (Reed et al. 2007a, 2007b). 
Reed and his coauthors show that personality traits such as moral identity, i.e., one‟s 
conception of how moral one is, can play a key role in driving one‟s preference for donating 
time vs. money. The present research extends Reed et al‟s (2007a, 2007b) work on personal 
dispositions by examining how and why ego-threats, i.e., instances where one‟s self-view is 
momentarily called into question by external agents or events, can help foster charitable 
behavior and lead individuals to prefer donating time over money to their favorite charities.  
2. Theoretical framework 
On any given day, consumers face a multitude of situations with the potential to 
threaten their sense of self as being good, virtuous, or successful (Sherman & Cohen 2006; 
Steele 1988). A few examples of such situations include substandard performance on the job 
or in class, frustrated goals or aspirations, information challenging the validity of long held 
beliefs, the defeat of one‟s political party in an election or of one‟s favorite sports team in a 
playoff, rejection in a romantic relationship, etc. In response to such ego-threats, consumers 
can engage in one of three behaviors. First, they can acknowledge their failure and use it for 
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attitudinal or behavioral change. Research in social psychology, however, has shown that 
such a course of action isn‟t always likely. Indeed, insofar as the threat encountered pertains 
to an important aspect of one‟s identity, the need to maintain self-esteem can make it difficult 
to accept the threatening information and to change one‟s attitude or behavior accordingly 
(Sherman & Cohen 2006). A second course of action is to dismiss, deny, derogate, or 
altogether avoid the threat and its source (Sherman & Cohen 2002). Though such a defensive 
response may protect self-esteem in the short run, ignoring threatening information is 
maladaptive in the long run as it jeopardizes one‟s chances to learn and grow from 
potentially critical feedback (Sherman & Cohen 2006). Self-affirmation, the third course of 
action, constitutes the basis of our investigation.  
According to self-affirmation theory (Steele & Liu 1983, Steele 1988, Steele, 
Spencer, & Lynch 1993), one of the self‟s major considerations consists of maintaining a 
perception of global integrity, that is, of overall moral and adaptive adequacy. Self-
affirmation can then be seen as an image-restoration process triggered whenever something 
in the environment, or in one‟s own behavior, threatens one‟s self-image. Since the goal of 
the system is to maintain an overall image of self-integrity, the self does not need to confront 
every attack emanating from the environment. Indeed, one may opt to leave certain threats 
untreated to instead affirm some other important self-concept, thereby reinforcing overall 
self-adequacy. In 1991, Tesser & Cornell provided a compelling demonstration of self-
affirmation flexibility. Adapting Steele & Liu‟s (1983) original paradigm, they showed that 
self-image distress resulting from an unfavorable social comparison could be relieved by 
recalling a favorable social experience of a different sort.  
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In light of these findings, we propose that by affirming a generous and/or 
compassionate dimension of the self, volunteerism, and to some extent financial 
philanthropy, may also serve a self-affirmation function for the threatened self. In most 
cultures, indeed, generosity and compassion are regarded as admirable qualities. Helping 
those in need is, for instance, a recurring theme in the bible: “When you reap the harvest of 
your land, you shall not reap to the very edges of your field, nor shall you gather the 
gleanings of your harvest. You shall not strip your vineyard bare, or gather the fallen grapes 
of your vineyard; you shall leave them for the poor and the alien: I am the LORD your God” 
(NRSV, Leviticus 19:9-10). Therefore, exhibiting charitableness may procure the injured self 
an opportunity to self-affirm by either fulfilling a religious duty or adhering to a socially-
praised custom.  
The psychology of time and money 
From a pure economics perspective, one would expect consumers to be indifferent 
between volunteering time and money to charities. Assuming, indeed, that a charity has no 
preference for receiving time or money contributions (i.e., the charity can benefit equally 
from either gift kind), a consumer who estimates one hour of his time to be worth $20 should 
find himself equally likely to volunteer $100 or five hours. Yet, a growing body of research 
in sociology, psychology, and marketing provides evidence departing from the above 
argument. In this section, we review these literatures to highlight how and why donating 
money versus time may not follow traditional economics principles. In doing so, we provide 
the foundation for our own hypothesis that volunteerism offers greater repair potential to the 
threatened self than financial philanthropy.  
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Why might consumers favor donating their time rather than an equivalent amount of 
money? One possible rationale is suggested in recent work by Zauberman & Lynch (2005) 
that demonstrates a common forecasting bias among consumers. Indeed, while consumers 
can be fairly accurate at predicting the amount of financial resources they will have available 
in the future, they become quite inaccurate when predicting their future availability of time. 
This over-prediction of the availability of time vs. money may thus be one reason why 
consumers would favor donating time over money when asked to commit help in the distant 
future. Yet, what would explain such a preference when the commitment to help is proximal 
in time?  
Recent work by Liu & Aaker (2008) proposing that time and money activate different 
mindsets in consumers may help answer this question. According to associative memory 
theory (Anderson & Bower 1973), individuals store the knowledge, goals, and concepts they 
acquire in associative networks. As a result, activating one concept in the network may 
automatically activate the rest of the network. Since people‟s representation of time is closely 
associated with happiness (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles 1999; Van Boven & Gilovich 
2003) while that of money is closely associated with economic utility (Lowenstein, Reid, & 
Baumeister 2003), Liu & Aaker (2008) argue that asking people to consider giving time 
activates well-being goals while considering giving money suppresses such goals and 
activates instead goals of economic utility (Brendl, Markman, and Messner 2003). In support 
of their claim, Liu & Aaker (2008) found that first asking participants about their mere 
intention to donate time (money) in favor of a charity before asking them to actually donate 
money to that charity significantly increased (decreased) the amount donated. Process 
insights suggested that this effect was in effect due to different mindsets. Merely considering 
6 
 
to donate time led participants to an emotional mindset in which giving was seen as a means 
toward emotional well-being and happiness. Thinking about donating money, in contrast, led 
participants to a value-maximizing mindset wherein the role of giving was seen less 
positively. In sum, measuring intentions to give time led to a more positive inclination to 
give, whereas measuring intentions to donate money led to more disengagement from giving.  
While the evidence provided in these studies supports the argument developed, such 
an account would not explain why some consumers may prefer donating money while others 
prefer donating time when the two options are presented simultaneously. Indeed, since 
volunteering time seems to be more closely associated with happiness than donating money 
(Liu & Aaker 2008), one would expect consumers to systematically prefer donating time, 
provided that the costs of donating time and money are equated (e.g., 5 hours vs. $100). 
Since such a systematic pattern may not fully describe consumer preference heterogeneity, 
what alternative mechanisms could explain why some consumers prefer donating time while 
others favor donating money?  
Research by Reed et al. (2007b) may provide an initial response to this question. 
Extending social resource theory (Foa & Foa 1980), Reed et al. (2007b) argue that one‟s 
orientation between donating time and money may be partly determined by the importance of 
one‟s moral identity, i.e., one‟s conception of how moral one is. Indeed, while donating 
money is generally a more rapid, indirect, and passive way of providing a social benefit, 
giving time requires a greater psychic and behavioral investment. Because donating time 
requires greater investment of the self, consumers who construe themselves as highly moral 
individuals will favor volunteerism (over financial philanthropy), as it more powerfully 
reinforces their moral self.  
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We extend the above stream of research on personality and moral identity by looking 
at the influence that situational factors may have on charitableness and donor orientation. 
Referring to self-affirmation theory (Steele & Liu 1983, Steele 1988, Steele, Spencer, & 
Lynch 1993), we propose that ego-threats, i.e., instances where one‟s self-view is 
momentarily called into question by external agents or events, can help foster charitable 
behavior and lead individuals to prefer donating time over money to their favorite charities. 
Furthermore, we hypothesize that this state of preference for time contributions when the self 
is under threat derives from perceiving volunteerism as more repairing than financial 
philanthropy. Indeed, to the extent that volunteering is likely to entail social exchange, the 
prospect of spending time with others may help mitigate ego-threats by creating meaning in 
life and establishing feelings of social embeddedness (Carstensen 1995, Rothbart 1994).  
We start our investigation by testing the prediction that ego-threats can lead 
charitably-oriented consumers to volunteer time more readily than money (study 1). In study 
2, we examine an alternative explanation for study 1‟s findings and show that, far from 
activating money-protection goals, ego-threats can actually lead consumers to donate more 
money to their favorite charity. In study 3, we test the hypothesis that ego-threatened 
participants may favor volunteerism over financial philanthropy because the former seems 
more repairing than the latter. In study 4, we shift our focus to the nature of ego-threats and 
show that a given threatening event may impact consumer donation behavior differently. We 
conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theory and practice.  
3. Study 1 
The purpose of study 1 was to test the hypothesis that, when threatened, the self 
becomes more likely to exhibit charitableness by volunteering time than by donating money. 
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To induce threat, we adopted a procedure by Brinol & Petty (2003) and Gao, Wheeler, & 
Shiv (2007). Participants first engaged in a graphology experiment whose alleged purpose 
was to predict their potential as a student and later as a business professional. Next, 
participants completed a seemingly unrelated volunteerism study. In line with our 
conceptualization, we predicted that participants in the threat condition during the 
graphology study would become more likely than control participants to favor volunteerism 
over financial philanthropy.  
Participants and procedure.  A total of forty six undergraduate students from a large 
southeastern American university took part in study 1. Thirty five students from the business 
school participated in exchange for course credit while the remaining eleven were recruited 
on campus and compensated $5 for completing short surveys in a 30 minutes long research 
session. Sessions were run in small groups of about twelve individuals.  
Upon arrival to our laboratory, participants were greeted and given time to read and 
sign a consent form. Next, they were told that the first study they would complete was a 
graphology experiment (cf. appendix 1) whose aim was to assess their potential as a student 
and later as a business professional. Instructions asked all participants to write a 100-word 
essay (+ or – 10%) in which they would develop three arguments illustrating why they are 
intelligent. Instructions in the threat condition differed from the control only in asking 
participants to use their nondominant hand (i.e., their left hand if they were right-handed, or 
their right hand if they were left-handed) to write the essay. Such a manipulation has been 
shown to reduce confidence in the arguments being developed and ultimately in the self 
(Brinol & Petty 2003). Following this handwriting manipulation, we collected demographics 
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(e.g., age, gender, GPA) and administered a seemingly unrelated survey about volunteerism 
(cf. appendix 2). 
Dependent variables.  The volunteerism survey indicated that the intent of the study 
was to capture people‟s true feelings and attitudes about volunteerism. After assuring 
participants that there were no right or wrong answers to the questionnaire and that we were 
only interested in their genuine responses (cf. Olson, Fazio, & Hermann 2007), we asked 
participants to indicate what they would be more likely to do in behalf of their favorite 
charity between donating a certain sum of money (i.e., $10, $30, $50, $70, $90, $110, $130) 
and volunteering a day of work. Seven questions were asked, each of which was anchored by 
a monetary donation (e.g., $10) on one end of the scale vs. volunteerism (i.e., one day‟s 
worth of work) on the other. An eighth question concluded the survey by asking participants 
what they would rather do in general between “donating money” and “volunteering time” for 
their favorite charity. All answers were reported on 1 to 8 likert scales such that no indecisive 
midpoint was available.  
Results 
Manipulation check.  To validate our procedure, we pretested our manipulation in a 
sample of students from the same southeastern American university. Upon completion of the 
handwriting task described earlier, we asked participants to indicate on a 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very) scale how confident they were in the arguments developed in their essay and the 
extent to which they felt intelligent at this very moment. As expected, we found that 
participants in the threat condition felt both less confident (Mthreat = 4.0 vs. Mcontrol = 5.1; F 
(1, 43) = 6.8, p < .02) and less intelligent (Mthreat = 4.6 vs. Mcontrol = 5.3; F (1, 43) = 4.9, p < 
.04) than control participants. Yet, when asked about the importance of intelligence to their 
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self-esteem, both groups expressed that intelligence was highly important (Mthreat = 6.1 vs. 
Mcontrol = 5.9; F (1, 43) < 1, NS). Such high means on a 7-point scale suggest that our threat 
manipulation did strike a key aspect of our participants‟ ego.  
Dependent variables.  An analysis of variance on our dependent variables confirmed 
our hypothesis: Threatened participants were generally more likely to donate time over 
money than control participants. On the first dependent measure (i.e., donating $10 vs. 
volunteering one day of work), control participants reported being more likely to donate 
money while threatened participants reported being more likely to donate time (Mcontrol = 3.8 
vs. Mthreat = 5.7; F (1, 44) = 8.0, p < .01). This pattern held on the second dependent measure 
(i.e., donating $30 vs. volunteering one day of work) whereby subjects in the threat condition 
were more likely to volunteer time than their counterparts in the control condition (Mcontrol = 
5.4 vs. Mthreat = 6.6 F (1, 44) = 5.7, p < .03). The third measure (i.e., donating $50 vs. 
volunteering one day of work) marginally replicated this pattern of results (Mcontrol = 6.2 vs. 
Mthreat = 7.0 F (1, 44) = 2.8, p = .1). The next four measures (i.e., donating $70, $90, $110, 
$130 vs. volunteering one day of work) did not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance (Fs < 1, NS). The eighth and last measure, which captured what participants 
would rather do in general between contributing money and time, confirmed the previous 
findings (Mcontrol = 5.2 vs. Mthreat = 6.7; F (1, 44) = 5.7, p < .03).  
Discussion 
These results seem to support our hypothesis: When their self-confidence was shaken, 
participants became more likely to volunteer time than donate money to their favorite charity. 
Yet, we see that this effect was bounded by the monetary donation requested. As the dollar 
amount increased, participants gradually preferred donating time over money. Past a certain 
11 
 
threshold, both control and threatened participants so overwhelmingly preferred volunteering 
time that differences between the two groups became statistically undistinguishable. 
Expectedly, limited financial resources on the part of our students left them with only 
volunteerism as a viable option once the monetary donation requested passed the $50 mark.  
We have so far argued that a momentary state of ego-threat can foster charitable 
behavior, particularly in the form of volunteerism. Though study 1‟s findings seem 
supportive of this claim, one challenging argument must be considered. What if this 
preference for volunteerism were not genuine but constrained by the binary nature of our 
dependent variables? It is conceivable after all that, rather than making participants more 
positively generous with their time, ego-threats activate instead a money-protection goal. If 
so, our participants might not have become more genuinely charitable in the form of time 
contributions; rather, they may have felt constrained to be so in order to save money. In the 
next study, we adjust our experimental paradigm to ascertain which of these two explanations 
can best account for participants‟ preferences in study 1.  
4. Study 2 
Study 1 left open for debate the interpretation of its results. While we had hoped to 
show that ego-threats may indeed strengthen consumers‟ preference for volunteerism over 
financial philanthropy, an alternative interpretation of our results emerged. According to this 
latter account, rather than fostering genuine charitableness in the form of time contributions, 
ego-threats may have activated instead a money-protection goal, which in turn led 
participants to donate time in an effort to save money. The goal of study 2 was to tease apart 
which of these two interpretations best fits the effect witnessed in study 1. To induce threat, 
we again adopted Brinol & Petty‟s procedure (2003; cf. study 1). Next, participants 
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completed a short and seemingly unrelated donation survey where they indicated which 
organization constituted their favorite charity as well as how much money, if any, they 
wished to contribute to it. Of importance here are the differences in predictions made. 
Consistent with our theorizing, we predicted that, in an attempt to repair their bruised self-
esteem, participants in the threat condition would donate more money than control 
participants. In contrast, the alternative explanation outlined earlier would predict the 
opposite, namely that threatened participants would pursue a money-protection goal and 
therefore donate less to their favorite charity.  
Participants and procedure.  A total of 68 undergraduate students from a large 
southeastern American university were recruited on campus and compensated $5 for 
completing short surveys in a 30 minutes long research session. Sessions were run in small 
groups of about twelve individuals. The procedure followed that of study 1 with one 
exception: Upon completion of the graphology study, participants moved on to a short 
donation survey in which they described their favorite charity and indicated how much 
money, if any, they wished to contribute to it. The amount of money pledged by each 
participant constituted our dependent variable.  
Results.  As expected, an analysis of variance with age and gender serving as 
covariates revealed that participants in the threat condition donated marginally more than 
control participants (Mthreat = $2.59 vs. Mcontrol = $1.64; F (1, 64) = 3.6, p < .07).  
Discussion 
Two radically different interpretations could make sense of study 1‟s findings. While 
we wished to argue that a state of self-threat led charitably-oriented consumers to genuinely 
favor volunteerism over financial philanthropy, we had to consider an alternative account: 
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Rather than fostering a positive preference for donating time, it is possible that our 
manipulation activated instead a money protection goal. As a result, threatened subjects were 
constrained by the nature of our dependent variable to donate time in order to save money. 
To ascertain which of these two interpretations could best explain our participants‟ 
preferences, in study 2 we used a monetary dependent variable. In a donation survey, 
students described their favorite charity and indicated how much money they wished to 
contribute to it. We predicted that participants in the threat condition would exhibit more 
generosity (i.e., donate more) as a way to repair their bruised esteem. In contrast, the 
competing account predicted that threatened participants would exhibit less generosity (i.e., 
donate less) in an effort to protect their finances. In line with our theorizing, we found that 
threatened participants donated 63% more of their own money than control participants. 
Hence, consistent with our hypothesis, ego-threats seem to have indeed the potential to 
foster, not hinder, charitableness. In fact, consistent with self-affirmation theory (Steele & 
Liu 1983, Steele 1988, Steele, Spencer, & Lynch 1993), it is conceivable that consumers may 
use charitable behavior strategically, though not necessarily consciously, as a means to repair 
their bruised self-esteem.  
But what would explain why threatened consumers favor donating time rather than an 
equivalent amount of money, as suggested by study 1? As mentioned earlier, we believe that 
volunteering may provide greater repair potential to the injured self than donating money. 
Indeed, to the extent that volunteering is likely to entail social exchange, the prospect of 
spending time with others may help regulate emotional states by creating meaning in life and 
establishing feelings of social embeddedness (Carstensen 1995, Rothbart 1994). In contrast, 
thinking about money tends to elicit more individualistic and self-sufficient goals 
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(Loewenstein, Read, & Baumeister 2003; Vohs, Mead, & Goode 2006). Together, these 
forces combine to lend support to our claim that when given the opportunity to choose, ego-
bruised consumers might find in volunteerism a better venue to restore their self-worth. We 
set out to test this hypothesis in the next study.  
5. Study 3 
The goal of study 3 was to shed light on why charitably-oriented consumers may 
favor volunteerism over financial philanthropy when under threat. To this end, we created a 
word integration task (WIT) for which participants completed a series of word problems 
before receiving bogus performance feedback. Next, borrowing a task from the self-
affirmation literature, we gave some participants the opportunity to repair their bruised self-
esteem in a seemingly unrelated memory study. Participants then went on to complete a 
shortened version of our volunteerism survey (cf. study 1). To conclude, participants filled 
out an attitude questionnaire whose alleged purpose was to capture consumers‟ attitudes 
about charitable donations. In reality, the attitude questionnaire was intended to capture 
participants‟ motives for choosing to donate time vs. money in the previously completed 
volunteerism survey.  
Participants and procedure.  One hundred and one undergraduate students from a 
large southeastern American university were recruited on campus and paid $5 for 
participating in a 30 minutes long research session in which study 3 was included. Sessions 
were run in groups of about fifteen individuals.  
As they arrived to the laboratory, participants were greeted and given time to read a 
consent form. After signing the form, participants received a stack of surveys, which 
included the word integration task. On its cover page, the WIT (cf. appendix 3) displayed 
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instructions in two parts. Part 1 informed participants that their goal in the study would be to 
generate words, which, given a set of three clue words, would result in word pairs that form a 
common compound word or phrase. Three examples were then given as illustrations. 
Example 1 read “cottage/swiss/cake” and offered the solution “cheese, as in cottage cheese, 
Swiss cheese, and cheese cake.” The second part of instructions informed participants that 
they would find on the next page twelve similar word problems and that they would be given 
six minutes to complete as many of them as possible. After verifying that everyone had had 
enough time to review the examples, the experimenter instructed participants to turn the page 
and start the study. Six minutes later, participants were informed that time was up and 
instructed to turn the page. On the following page, participants discovered an answer key and 
a bogus performance table. Participants in the control (threat) condition read that 0 or 1 (8 or 
fewer) correct answers placed them in the bottom third; 2 or 3 (9 or 10) correct answers 
placed them in the middle third; and finally, that 4 or more (11 or 12) correct answers placed 
them in the top third of performers. In reality, to make up the WIT, we selected twelve 
remote associates problems of average difficulty from Bowden & Beeman (2003), i.e., 
problems pretested such that participants would solve 50% of them within 30 seconds. 
Hence, we expected participants to solve on average six problems, thereby leading them to 
believe that they belonged to the top third of performers if they were in the control, or bottom 
third if they were in the threat condition.  
Underneath the answer key and performance table, a stem written in the first person 
(i.e., I had ___ correct answers) prompted participants to report the number of correct 
answers they were able to generate. Next, instructions asked participants to refer to the 
performance table and indicate which performance group they belonged to, based on the 
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number of correct answers they had. To report their performance, participants were to check 
the appropriate space in the stem “My performance places me in the __ top third; __ middle 
third; __ bottom third.” The last question on the page asked participants to indicate how 
difficult they found the word integration task on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) likert scale. 
The following page consisted of Heatherton & Polivy‟s (1991) performance-related self-
esteem subscale (cf. appendix 4).  
Upon completion of the WIT, participants discovered the memory study whose 
alleged purpose was to examine how well people can remember mundane events of life. In 
reality, we borrowed a repair procedure from the self-affirmation literature (Steele 1988; 
White & Lehman 2005; cf. appendices 5 and 6) to provide some participants an opportunity 
to restore their bruised self-esteem. After ranking the importance of eleven traits and values 
(e.g., relations with friends, sense of humor, social skills), participants in the self-affirmation 
(no self-affirmation) condition were asked to explain why their first (ninth) ranked value was 
important to them (may be important to someone else) and to recall in detail one instance 
where expressing or acting on this value had caused them (someone other than them) to feel 
good about themselves. Next, participants completed Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski‟s 
(2001) measure of state self-esteem (cf. appendix 7) and a shorter version of the volunteerism 
survey (cf. study 1). Only the first three donation questions of the original survey were 
featured here (i.e., donating $10, $30, $50 vs. volunteering one day of work).  
Finally, participants filled out an attitude questionnaire whose alleged purpose was to 
capture consumers‟ attitudes about charitable donations. In reality, the purpose of this 
questionnaire was to gain insights about participants‟ motivation for choosing to donate time 
vs. money in the previously completed volunteerism survey. In line with our 
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conceptualization, we devised a short scale to assess participants‟ beliefs about the repair 
efficacy of time vs. money donations. To validate the measure, 189 pretest participants 
indicated on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) likert scale the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with a series of statements. All statements in the scale followed the stem “It is 
more _________ to support a charitable cause by donating time rather than money”, where 
the adjectives “enriching, fulfilling, rewarding, satisfying, uplifting” were successively 
inserted in place of the blank. A varimax rotated factor analysis confirmed that all five items 
loaded on only one factor (cf. table 1). We thus collapsed these items into one aggregate 
measure (α = .87) such that higher (lower) scores indicated stronger beliefs that volunteerism 
(financial philanthropy) is indeed more repairing than financial philanthropy (volunteerism).  
Results 
As mentioned earlier, to devise the WIT, we selected twelve word problems of 
average difficulty from Bowden & Beeman (2003), i.e., problems pretested such that 
participants would solve 50% of them (i.e., 6 problems) within 30 seconds. Most control 
(threatened) participants conformed to these expectations and therefore wound up believing 
that they belonged to the top (bottom) third of performers. Twenty five participants, however, 
solved either far fewer or far more problems than expected and wound up believing that they 
belonged to the middle third of performers. These participants were withdrawn from our 
analyses so as to not bias our results.  
Manipulation checks.  To validate our experimental procedure, we submitted the data 
collected in the word integration task and the first self-esteem scale (Heatherton & Polivy 
1991) to an analysis of variance. As expected, our Anova confirmed that participants 
assigned to the threat condition, i.e., participants whose performance feedback led them to 
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believe that they belonged to the bottom third of performers, perceived the WIT to be more 
difficult than participants in the control condition, i.e., participants led to believe they 
belonged to the top third of performers (Mthreat = 4.9 vs. Mcontrol = 4.4; F (1, 69) = 5.0, p < 
.03). Perhaps more importantly, our Anova further revealed that threatened participants 
exhibited less favorable levels of self-esteem (Mthreat = 26.6 vs. Mcontrol = 30.0; F (1, 69) = 
13.1, p < .01). To look at the effect of our repair manipulation, we examined participants‟ 
state of self-esteem immediately after the self-affirmation procedure (i.e., the memory study). 
Our Anova on this 2 (Control vs. Threat) by 2 (Self-affirmation vs. No self-affirmation) 
between-subjects design revealed no main effects (Fs < 1) but a marginally significant 
interaction (F(1, 69) = 3.1, p < .09). As expected, in the control condition, having an 
opportunity to self-affirm seemed to have no impact on self-esteem (Mno self-affirmation = 4.1 vs. 
Mself-affirmation = 3.8). In the threat condition, however, participants who didn‟t get to self-
affirm exhibited esteem levels inferior to that of their counterparts in the affirmation 
condition (Mno self-affirmation = 3.5 vs. Mself-affirmation = 4.0; cf. figure 1). Collectively, these 
results suggest that our manipulations functioned as intended.  
Dependent variables.  Having verified that our manipulations had produced their 
intended effect, we next turned our attention to the dependent variables. An analysis of 
variance on the first outcome measure (i.e., donating $10 vs. volunteering one day of work) 
revealed no main effects (Fs < 1) but a significant interaction (F(1, 69) = 4.5, p < .04; cf. 
figure 2). In the control condition, having an opportunity to self-affirm seemed to have no 
impact on participants‟ charitable orientation (Mno self-affirmation = 4.8 vs. Mself-affirmation = 5.5). In 
the threat condition, however, participants who had not had an opportunity to reaffirm their 
self-worth exhibited stronger preferences for donating time over money than their 
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counterparts in the self-affirmation condition (Mno self-affirmation = 6.2 vs. Mself-affirmation = 4.9). 
This pattern of results carried over to the next outcome measure (i.e., donating $30 vs. 
volunteering one day of work) at a marginal level of statistical significance (F(1, 69) = 2.9, p 
< .1) but failed to do so for the last dependent variable (donating $50 vs. volunteering one 
day of work; F(1, 69) < 1.1, NS).  
Mediation analysis.  To explain why ego-threats may lead consumers to favor 
volunteerism over financial philanthropy, we proposed that the repair efficacy of the former 
may be perceived to be greater than that of the latter. To examine this hypothesis, we tested 
whether participants‟ answers to the attitude questionnaire mediated their preference for time 
vs. money contributions. Our dependent variable in the present analysis is participants‟ 
answer to the first question of the volunteerism survey (i.e., donating $10 vs. volunteering 
one day of work).  
According to Baron & Kenny (1986), mediation is supported if: (1) the independent 
variable predicts the outcome variable; (2) the independent variable predicts the supposed 
mediator; and (3) the mediator predicts the outcome variable in the presence of the 
independent variable. In the case of a mediated moderation, the same requirements apply but 
the independent variable becomes the interaction term and its constituting main effects are 
treated as covariates.  
As mentioned earlier, an Anova on our dependent variable revealed no main effects 
(Fs < 1) but a significant threat by affirmation interaction F(1, 69) = 4.5, p < .04). We 
replicated these results in a regression analysis (Bthreat = .209, t < 1, NS; Baffirmation = -.164, t < 
1, NS; Bthreat by affirmation = -.475, t = 2.1, p < .04), thereby satisfying Baron & Kenny‟s (1986) 
first condition. Next, using participants‟ scores on the attitude questionnaire as the outcome 
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variable, we ran a second regression analysis and found again no main effects but a 
marginally significant threat by affirmation interaction (Bthreat = -.033, t < 1, NS; Baffirmation = -
.777, t < 1.2, NS; Bthreat by affirmation = -1.264, t = 1.9, p = .06). These results suggest that our 
interaction term could also predict the mediator, thereby satisfying condition 2. Lastly, to test 
condition 3, we ran a regression analysis which included as predictors our two main effects, 
their interaction term, and the mediator. In this last model, only the mediator remained a 
significant predictor of the dependent variable (Bthreat = .213, t = 1.0, NS; Baffirmation = -.068, t 
< 1, NS; Bthreat by affirmation = -.318, t = 1.5, NS; Bmediator = .124, t = 3.2, p < .01), thereby 
suggesting mediation. A marginally significant Soble test (1982) confirmed this effect (z = 
1.6, p < .1). 
Discussion 
The goal of study 3 was to further investigate the link between ego-threats and 
charitable behavior. More specifically, we sought to examine why charitably-oriented 
consumers may favor volunteerism over financial philanthropy after facing ego-threatening 
situations. To induce threat, we provided participants poor performance feedback upon 
completion of a problem-solving task. Next, we gave some participants an opportunity to 
restore their sense of self-worth by affirming values important to them in a writing task 
(Steele 1988; White & Lehman 2005). As in study 1, we found that participants expressed 
stronger preferences for donating time over money when under threat. Yet, this effect 
weakened when subjects had an opportunity to reaffirm their self. To explain why ego-threats 
lead consumers to exhibit charitableness more readily through time than money donations, 
we proposed that the repair potential of the former may be perceived to be greater than that 
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of the latter. In line with this argument, we found that participants‟ beliefs about the repair 
efficacy of volunteerism mediated the effect of threat on donation behavior.  
While study 3 shed light on why charitably-oriented consumers may favor 
volunteerism over financial philanthropy, our investigation has yielded few insights so far 
about the nature of the threats at work. In studies 1 and 2, our ego-threats pertained to one‟s 
perception of one‟s intelligence. In study 3, our threat manipulation consisted of failure 
feedback on a problem-solving task. Though different in some regards, these tasks could also 
be seen as variations on the same theme: intellectual achievement. Hence, one might wonder 
about the generalizability of our findings. Do all threats lead to favor volunteerism over 
financial philanthropy? Or are our results the byproducts of the specific manipulations we 
used? In the next study, we set out to examine the extent to which the nature of the threat at 
play may influence donation behavior. Specifically, we examine whether the basic effect 
found in studies 1 and 3 can be moderated by the centrality of the threat to one‟s self-
concept.  
6. Study 4 
The purpose of study 4 was to further test the relationship between ego-threats and 
charitableness. Specifically, we sought to examine whether the centrality of the threat to 
one‟s self-concept may moderate the general impact of ego-threats on donation behavior. To 
induce threat, we created a task requiring that participants compare themselves to pictures of 
attractive young men and women. Next, participants completed a seemingly unrelated 
volunteerism survey. In line with our conceptualization, we expected that participants in the 
threat condition during the picture study would become more likely than control participants 
to volunteer time over money. Yet, we qualified this prediction by restricting it to 
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participants whose self-esteem significantly depends on physical appearance. In other words, 
we expected that our threat manipulation would produce its greatest effect on participants for 
whom personal attractiveness matters most.  
Participants and procedure.  A total of fifty three undergraduate students from the 
same large southeastern American university took part in study 4. Thirty six students from 
the business school participated in exchange for course credit while the remaining seventeen 
were recruited on campus and compensated $5 for completing short surveys in a 30-minute 
research session. Sessions were run in small groups of about twelve individuals.  
Upon arrival to our laboratory, participants were greeted and given time to read and 
sign a consent form. Next, participants were handed the picture study, our threat 
manipulation. Instructions on the cover page informed participants that we had selected 
pictures of college students from a popular website. Participants were to review this 
assortment of anonymous photographs and indicate for each picture how attractive the person 
was compared to them (cf. appendices 8 and 9). Instructions further stressed “Please try to be 
as accurate as possible. Using a “third person” approach may help. For instance, if 
someone other than you were to judge your attractiveness vs. that of the person depicted, 
what would they say?” The next few pages presented five photographs. Each photo was 
followed by the stem “Compared to this person, I am…” and a 1 (not at all attractive) to 9 
(very attractive) likert scale on which participants reported their rating. When finished with 
the picture study, participants filled out the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS) scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen 1988; cf. appendix 10) whose purpose was to 
serve as a manipulation check, and a shortened version of the volunteerism survey (cf. study 
1). After filling out several unrelated questionnaires, participants ended the research session 
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by completing Crocker et al.‟s Contingencies of Self-Worth scale (2003; cf. appendix 11). 
Our goal here was to capture how important each participant‟s physical appearance was to 
his/her self-esteem. 
Threat manipulation.  To create the picture study, we selected twenty photographs 
from the popular website amihotornot.com, where thousands of people post pictures of 
themselves for visitors of the site to rate. The pictures we presented in the control condition 
consisted of five young men (women, if the participant was female) of average attractiveness, 
whereas those featured in the threat condition consisted of five young and highly attractive 
men (women). Our goal here was to threaten participants‟ ego by engaging them in self-
comparisons with attractive individuals of their sex.  
Results 
Manipulation checks.  As expected, across all five pictures, participants in the threat 
condition evaluated themselves less favorably than their counterparts in the control condition 
(Mthreat = 5.8 vs. Mcontrol = 7.2; F (1, 52) = 12.3, p < .01). Analyses of the PANAS data also 
revealed that threatened participants experienced less positive affect (Mthreat = 23.1 vs. Mcontrol 
= 30.6; F(1, 52) = 15.1, p < .01) and marginally more negative affect (Mthreat = 14.6 vs. 
Mcontrol = 12.5, F(1, 52) = 3.2, p < .09). Collectively, these findings suggest that our threat 
manipulation did function as intended.  
Dependent variable.  The dependent variable in this shortened version of the 
volunteerism survey consisted of the last question of the original survey, i.e., In general, 
what would you rather do between donating money and volunteering time in favor of your 
preferred charity? With age and gender as covariates, an analysis of variance on this 2 
(Control vs. Threat) by 2 (Importance of physical appearance: Low vs. High) design revealed 
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no main effects (Fs < 1) but a significant interaction (F(1, 47) = 4.3, p < .05; cf. figure 3). In 
the control condition, participants caring less about their appearance did not differ from those 
caring more in terms of preferring to donate time over money (Mlow appearance importance = 5.3 vs. 
Mhigh appearance importance = 4.8). In the threat condition, however, while participants low on 
appearance importance remained indifferent between donating time and money, those high 
on appearance importance increasingly favored donating time (Mlow appearance importance = 4.7 vs. 
Mhigh appearance importance = 5.9).  
Discussion 
The results of study 4 replicate our previous findings and further confirm our 
hypothesis that, when threatened, the self may prefer to exhibit charitableness through time 
rather than monetary donations. Furthermore, study 4 extends our previous findings by 
shedding light on the importance of the threat‟s nature. Indeed, our results here suggest that a 
given threatening event may impact consumers differently. In the present case, while 
engaging in threatening comparisons strengthened preferences to volunteer time for 
individuals heavily invested in their looks, it didn‟t do so for individuals less concerned by 
their physical appearance. As alluded to earlier, we believe that participants low on 
appearance importance did not exhibit a behavioral shift in favor of volunteerism because the 
threat did not concern a core aspect of their self.  
7. General discussion 
On any given day, consumers face a multitude of situations with the potential to 
damage their sense of self and identity (Sherman & Cohen 2006; Steele 1988). Examples of 
such situations include disappointing a significant other, underperforming on the job, failing 
to deliver on a promise, gaining weight, etc. The purpose of this research was to examine 
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how ego-threats, i.e., instances where one‟s self-view is momentarily called into question by 
external agents or events, can influence charitable behavior. Two propositions guided our 
enquiry. First, we hypothesized that a state of self-threat may have the potential to foster 
charitableness in consumers. Grounding this prediction in self-affirmation theory, (Steele & 
Liu 1983, Steele 1988), we proposed that by affirming a generous and/or compassionate 
dimension of the self, volunteerism, and to some extent financial philanthropy, may serve a 
repair function for the injured self. Furthermore, we hypothesized that if given the choice, 
ego-threatened individuals would favor to donate time rather than money. Grounding this 
prediction in the social psychological literature (Carstensen 1995, Rothbart 1994), we 
proposed that this state of preference for time contributions would derive from perceiving 
volunteerism as more repairing than financial philanthropy.  
In line with our theorizing, we found in studies 1 and 2 that reducing one‟s 
confidence in his or her intelligence via a seemingly innocuous handwriting manipulation 
(Brinol & Petty 2003) led participants to exhibit greater charitableness (i.e., donate more 
money) in favor of their preferred charity. Yet, when participants were given the choice to 
donate time or money, volunteerism became the preferred option. To examine why 
consumers may opt to donate time more readily than money when under threat, we provided 
participants in study 3 poor performance feedback upon completion of a problem-solving 
task. Next, we gave some participants an opportunity to restore their sense of self-worth by 
affirming values important to them in a writing task (Steele 1988; White & Lehman 2005). 
We found again that participants expressed stronger preferences for donating time over 
money when under threat. Yet, this effect weakened when subjects had had an opportunity to 
reaffirm their self. A mediation analysis revealed that participants‟ beliefs about the repair 
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efficacy of volunteerism mediated the effect of threat on donation behavior. In study 4, we 
sought to extend our findings by investigating the effect of threats unrelated to intellectual 
achievement. Furthermore, we sought to examine whether the centrality of the threat to one‟s 
self-concept may moderate the general impact of ego-threats on charitableness. To this end, 
we created a task requiring that participants compare themselves to pictures of attractive 
individuals of their sex before responding to a seemingly unrelated charity appeal. As 
expected, we found that participants in the threat condition during the picture study became 
more likely than control participants to volunteer time over money. Yet, this effect was 
restricted to participants whose self-esteem significantly depends on physical appearance 
(i.e., individuals heavily invested in their looks). In sum, across four experiments, we showed 
that ego-threatening events can indeed lead consumers to greater charitableness. 
Furthermore, we found that when given the opportunity to choose, ego-bruised consumers 
tend to favor volunteerism over financial philanthropy as the former is perceived to be more 
repairing than the latter.  
Theoretical and managerial implications 
By demonstrating the effect that ego-threats can have on consumers‟ preferences to 
volunteer time versus money, this research contributes notably to the decision-making 
literature. Indeed, while prior work investigated time and money as they relate to the 
valuation of delayed consumption (Lowenstein 1987), slack perception (Zauberman & Lynch 
2005), or time worth (DeVoe & Pfeffer 2007), this research highlights the psychological 
repair properties that time and money can offer to the self while under attack. More 
importantly, by highlighting some of the motivation leading consumers to exhibit 
charitableness, our findings also contribute to the altruism literature. Prior research has 
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proposed a variety of factors to explain helping behavior. Emotions such as empathy (Batson 
1987) and sympathy (Small, Lowenstein, & Slovic 2007) have, for instance, been put forth as 
determinants of charitableness. Collectivism (Tajfel 1981) and mortality salience (Ferraro, 
Shiv, & Bettman 2005; Jonas et al. 2002) are other known triggers. As mentioned earlier, 
work by Liu & Aaker (2008) on decisional mindset and Reed et al. (2007a; 2007b) on moral 
identity uncovered how behavioral intentions and personality traits could also influence 
altruistic behavior. By shedding light on the functions that giving time or money may hold 
for the self at certain times, this research contributes new insights to the situational 
determinants of altruism.  
Our findings are also informative from a managerial standpoint. Indeed, in times of 
economic recession (Willis & Chandra 2008) and rarefaction of volunteers (US Labor 
Department 2007), harvesting help from donors constitutes the most critical challenge 
nonprofits face today (West 2004). By documenting the directional impact that self-threats 
exert on donor response, this research offers a more nuanced understanding of donor 
psychology. Specifically, our results may help charities design more efficient communication 
campaigns toward and/or retention programs of their benefactors. For instance, while little 
insight on the effect of ego-threats (e.g. ads featuring guilt-appeals or social comparisons) 
existed to guide nonprofits in their advertising strategy, the findings presented here suggest 
that such techniques may be advantageous in some cases (e.g., when the goal of the 
campaign is to draw volunteer labor) and suboptimal in others (e.g., when the objective is to 
raise funds while both time and money contributions are accepted).  
Limitations & future research 
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While our findings support our overall theorizing, certain limitations must be noted. 
First among these limitations is the influence of mood in our studies. A main claim of our 
research is that ego-threats, i.e., instances where one‟s self-view is momentarily being 
challenged, can depress one‟s state of self-esteem. Referring to self-affirmation theory 
(Steele & Liu 1983, Steele 1988), we further argued that by exhibiting charitableness in 
response to self-threats, consumers are able to affirm a generous and/or compassionate 
dimension of their identity. As such, engaging in volunteerism or financial philanthropy 
provides a repair opportunity to the injured self by, for instance, fulfilling a religious duty or 
adhering to a socially-praised custom. Yet, one might argue that mood, not self-esteem, may 
be the driving force behind our findings (Cialdini et al. 1987). Indeed, one can easily see that 
the type of ego-threat manipulations we use may very well also impact mood. We readily 
concur with this idea that mood may have been present in our studies. In fact, we even 
documented through our manipulation checks in study 4 that participants who had engaged in 
self-disserving social comparisons experienced less positive affect and more negative affect 
relative to participants in the control condition. Yet, two elements of our investigation lead us 
to believe that mood cannot in and of itself account for all of our results. The first element 
concerns our original experiment where the affect data we collected following the 
graphology study revealed that our handwriting manipulation seemed to shake participants‟ 
confidence in their intelligence, not their mood. Indeed, ego-threatened participants did not 
differ from control on either positive affect (Mthreat = 21.2 vs. Mcontrol = 22.1; F(1, 33) < 1, 
NS) or negative affect (Mthreat = 15.6 vs. Mcontrol = 15.2; F(1, 33) < 1, NS).  
The second element concerns the mood argument itself. If true, this alternative 
explanation of our results should be able to stand experimental enquiry on its own. To test it, 
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we recruited thirty four undergraduate students from the same southeastern American 
university and ran a two-group design experiment in which we manipulated mood, but kept 
self-esteem constant. In the control (negative mood) condition, participants wrote a 
paragraph reflecting on their current feelings and attitudes as they contemplated the picture 
of a (badly beaten and injured) dog (cf. appendices 12 and 13). Upon finishing their essay, 
participants completed a series of manipulations checks aimed at measuring mood and self-
esteem (Rosenberg 1965; cf. appendix 14) before concluding with the same volunteerism 
survey as in study 3. As expected, manipulations checks revealed that participants in the 
negative mood condition perceived the picture to be less pleasant (Mnegative mood = 2.2 vs. 
Mcontrol = 7.9; F(1, 32) = 199.6, p < .01) or entertaining (Mnegative mood = 1.7 vs. Mcontrol = 6.1; 
F(1, 32) = 64.6, p < .01), but more disturbing (Mnegative mood = 7.0 vs. Mcontrol = 1.4; F(1, 32) = 
123.0, p < .01) and distressing (Mnegative mood = 6.6 vs. Mcontrol =1.5; F(1, 32) = 110.9, p < .01) 
than control participants. Furthermore, negative-mood participants reported feeling sadder 
(Mnegative mood = 7.2 vs. Mcontrol = 3.3; F(1, 32) = 59.3, p < .01) and overall worse (Mnegative mood 
= 6.9 vs. Mcontrol = 3.0; F(1, 32) = 57.6, p < .01) than their counterparts in the control 
condition. Importantly, however, our measure of state self-esteem revealed no difference 
between the two groups (Mnegative mood = 8.5 vs. Mcontrol = 7.8; F(1, 32) = 2.2, NS). Having 
verified that our manipulation had functioned as expected, we next turned our attention to the 
dependent variables. For memory, the mood argument would predict that participants in the 
negative mood condition would again favor volunteerism more readily than control 
participants whereas we predicted that, in the absence of ego-threat, the null hypothesis 
would hold. As expected, we found that the two groups differed on none of the three 
dependent variables. While these results certainly do not rule out mood as a contributing 
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force in shaping consumers‟ donation behavior, they nonetheless suggest that mood cannot in 
and of itself produce the behavioral shifts observed across our studies. 
The second limitation we wish to acknowledge concerns the higher-order mechanism 
for the effect we replicated in studies 1, 3, and 4. To explain why participants exhibit 
stronger preferences for donating time than money when under threat, we showed in a 
mediation analysis that volunteerism was perceived as more repairing than financial 
philanthropy (cf. study 3). In a follow-up study, we attempted to go a step further and 
understand why donating time may appear as a better venue to restore self-worth. To this 
end, we recruited from the same southeastern American university 114 undergraduate 
students who completed our study in exchange for course credit. Upon arrival to our 
laboratory, participants completed some demographics before being again randomly assigned 
to either a threat or control condition. In the threat (control) condition, participants completed 
a similar word integration task (WIT; cf. appendices 15 and 16) as the one outlined in study 
3. Rather than providing either positive or negative feedback upon completion of a given set 
of word problems, we chose here to feature ten either easy or difficult problems, which we 
borrowed again from Bowden & Beeman‟s (2003) bank. Upon finishing the WIT, 
participants completed a series of manipulation checks, Heatherton & Polivy‟s (1991) 
performance-related self-esteem subscale, and the mood short form (Peterson & Sauber 
1983; cf. appendix 17). Next participants completed one of two versions of a seemingly 
unrelated donation survey named The Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS) Survey (cf. 
appendices 18 and 19). In preamble, the BBBS survey informed participants that the purpose 
of the study was to assess a communication campaign by the BBBS foundation. After 
reading the alleged ad, which introduced the organization, its mission, and some of its 
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accomplishments, participants were asked to imagine what they would rather contribute in 
favor of BBBS between money and time. In the time-neutral condition, the survey asked 
participants to indicate on a 1 to 8 scale their relative preference between donating $10 
(anchored on one end of the scale) vs. 8 hours collating fundraising materials and stuffing 
envelopes (anchored on the other end of the scale). In contrast, the time-repair condition 
featured the options to donate $10 or 8 hours helping children with their homework.  
To validate our procedure, we tested the perceived repair efficacies of tutoring and 
collating fundraising materials. Using the same list of adjectives as in study 3, we asked 
participants to indicate on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very) scale how enriching, fulfilling, 
rewarding, satisfying, and uplifting they would find to tutor children and collate fundraising 
materials for 8 hours. As expected, participants perceived tutoring children to be more 
repairing than collating fundraising materials (Mtutoring = 6.2 vs. Mcollating = 2.3, t = 26.4, p < 
.01). Further manipulations checks revealed that participants in the threat condition of the 
WIT predicted having performed more poorly than control participants (Mthreat = 1.9 vs. 
Mcontrol = 4.2; F(1, 113) = 75.2, p < .01) and reported finding the task more difficult (Mthreat = 
5.9 vs. Mcontrol = 4.5; F(1, 113) = 43.8, p < .01). Consistent with these results, ego-threatened 
participants exhibited lower levels of self-esteem (Mthreat = 24.8 vs. Mcontrol = 27.8; F(1, 113) 
= 8.8, p < .01) and less positive mood (Mthreat = 12.1 vs. Mcontrol = 14.1; F(1, 113) = 5.7, p < 
.02). Having verified that our manipulations had functioned as expected, we next turned our 
attention to the dependent variable, i.e., participants‟ relative preference between donating 
time and money.  
Because consumers are subject to various time and financial constraints which may in 
turn impact baseline donor orientation, we attempted to control in this study for our 
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participants‟ idiosyncratic opportunity costs of time and money. To do so, we asked 
respondents to indicate how much free time they had on a weekly basis as well as how much 
money they would be willing to pay to keep it (i.e., how much was worth this time to them). 
With these two elements as covariates, an Anova on this 2 (Threat vs. Control) by 2 (Time: 
Repair vs. Neutral) design revealed no main effects (Fs < 1.7) but a marginally significant 
interaction (F(1, 108) = 2.8, p < .1; cf. figure 4). In the control condition, participants facing 
the choice of donating $10 vs. 8 hours tutoring children did not differ from those 
contemplating donating $10 or 8 hours stuffing envelopes on behalf of BBBS (Mtime repair = 
3.5 vs. Mtime neutral = 3.7). In the threat condition, however, participants in the time-repair 
condition exhibited increasingly stronger preferences for donating time (i.e., tutoring 
children) whereas their counterparts in the time-neutral condition increasingly favored 
donating money (Mtime repair = 4.2 vs. Mtime neutral = 2.8).  
In sum, these results suggest that while volunteerism may seem preferable at first 
sight to the ego-threatened consumer, such a preference can be reversed in favor of financial 
philanthropy under certain conditions. Indeed, participants in the threat condition considered 
donating time only when time was perceived to be repairing, i.e., when it entailed tutoring 
children. In contrast, when donating time involved less repairing activities such as collating 
fundraising materials and stuffing envelopes, ego-threatened participants preferred to 
contribute money. Hence, we believe that future research on the mental representation of 
volunteerism may be instrumental in understanding why and how consumers resort to 
volunteer rather than donate money. We conjecture that consumers may naturally construe 
volunteerism at an abstract and desirable level. As a result, when facing the choice to donate 
time or money, it may be easier to think of volunteering in more positive or repairing terms 
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than donating money. Along these lines, further research on the assumed social dimension of 
volunteering may also hold value. Specifically, one might examine whether volunteerism 
automatically evokes thoughts of direct contact with the beneficiaries of our help (as is the 
case in our last study) or of belongingness and togetherness, as is the case when one directly 
interacts with fellow volunteers (e.g., Habitat for Humanity). If so, the strength of such 
mental associations may in turn moderate one‟s orientation between donating time and 
money.  
Conclusion 
Time and money donations are inherently consumer decisions. Indeed, either one of 
these resources not allocated to a charitable cause could, or will, otherwise be invested in 
consumption-related activities (Reed et al. 2007b). The intention of this research was to show 
that ego-threats, i.e., menaces to one‟s sense of self and identity, can foster charitableness 
and influence donor orientation between volunteerism and financial philanthropy. The 
findings documented across our experiments call for further investigation of the meaning that 
volunteering time and donating money hold for the self. By better understanding their 
respective function, we shall be able to assess more accurately the value that consumers can 
extract from one act of charitableness versus the other.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Total Variance Explained and Factor Loadings (study 3) 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.279 65.574 65.574 3.279 65.574 65.574 
2 .599 11.978 77.552    
3 .484 9.670 87.222    
4 .376 7.521 94.743    
5 .263 5.257 100.000    
Component 
matrix (a) 
Component 
1 
Q1 .841 
Q2 .824 
Q3 .887 
Q4 .780 
Q5 .705 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
(a) 1 components extracted. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 
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5
Control Threat
State self-esteem following affirmation procedure (study 3)
No self-affirmation
Self-affirmation
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Figure 2 
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Control Threat
Note: 1 (8) indicates strongest preference for donating money (time)
Relative preference between donating $10 and 8 hours (study 3)
No self-affirmation
Self-affirmation
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Figure 3 
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Control Threat
Note: 1 (8) indicates strongest preference for donating money (time)
Relative preference between donating money and time (study 4)
Low appearance importance
High appearance importance
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Figure 4 
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Control Threat
Note: 1 (8) indicates strongest preference for donating money (time)
Relative preference between donating money and time (follow up study B)
Time neutral
Time repair
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Handwriting manipulation (studies 1 and 2) 
 
Graphology study 
 
This study was designed to investigate the validity of graphology in predicting academic 
performance. This study is only experimental and intends to assess your potential as a student 
and later as a business professional.  
 
Instructions: Please [use your non-dominant hand (i.e., your left hand if you are right-handed, 
or your right hand if you are left-handed) to] write an essay about your intelligence in the 
space provided below. Make sure to develop at least 3 points illustrating why you think you 
are intelligent. Your essay should be 100 words long (+ or – 10%). 
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Appendix 2: Volunteerism survey (study 1) 
 
Volunteerism survey 
 
This survey intends to capture people‟s true feelings and attitudes about volunteerism. Please 
answer the following questions genuinely. There is no right or wrong answer. We are only 
interested in your genuine response. Thank you.  
 
 
 
1. What would you be more likely to do? (circle a number) 
 
Give $10 to your Volunteer 1 day of work
favorite charity to your favorite charity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
2. What would you be more likely to do? (circle a number) 
 
Give $30 to your Volunteer 1 day of work
favorite charity to your favorite charity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
3. What would you be more likely to do? (circle a number) 
 
Give $50 to your Volunteer 1 day of work
favorite charity to your favorite charity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
4. What would you be more likely to do? (circle a number) 
 
Give $70 to your Volunteer 1 day of work
favorite charity to your favorite charity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
5. What would you be more likely to do? (circle a number) 
 
Give $90 to your Volunteer 1 day of work
favorite charity to your favorite charity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
6. What would you be more likely to do? (circle a number) 
 
Give $110 to your Volunteer 1 day of work
favorite charity to your favorite charity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
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7. What would you be more likely to do? (circle a number) 
 
Give $130 to your Volunteer 1 day of work
favorite charity to your favorite charity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
8. In general, would you rather volunteer time or give money to your favorite charity?  
I'd rather I'd rather
give money volunteer time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
9. Name below one charitable organization that defends/promotes a cause important to you.  
 
___________________________________________ 
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Appendix 3: Word Integration Task (study 3) 
 
Word Integration Task 
 
Instructions – Part 1:  Please direct your attention to the examples below. Each example 
offers 3 stimulus words. The goal of this study is to generate a fourth word, which, when 
combined with each of the three stimulus words, would result in word pairs that are a 
common compound word or phrase. There can only be one answer per word problem. 
 
 
 
Example 1:  cottage/swiss/cake    
 
→ Answer: cheese as in cottage cheese, swiss cheese, cheese cake 
 
 
 
Example 2:  cream/skate/water 
 
→ Answer: ice as in ice cream, ice skate, ice water 
 
 
 
Example 3:  show/life/row 
 
→ Answer: boat as in boat show, life boat, row boat 
 
 
 
Instructions – Part 2:  On the next page, you will find 12 word problems and be given exactly 
6 minutes (about 30 seconds per problem) to complete the task.  
 
 
 
STOP! 
 
Please wait for the experimenter‟s instructions before turning the page. 
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You may now start. Remember that you will have no more than 6 minutes to complete the 
task. There can only be one answer per word problem.  
 
 
 
1. dust/cereal/fish  → ______________________________ 
 
 
2. palm/shoe/house  → ______________________________ 
 
 
3. wheel/hand/shopping  → ______________________________ 
 
 
4. mill/tooth/dust  → ______________________________ 
 
 
5. fly/clip/wall  → ______________________________ 
 
 
6. wagon/break/radio  → ______________________________ 
 
 
7. dress/dial/flower  → ______________________________ 
 
 
8. animal/back/rat  → ______________________________ 
 
 
9. house/thumb/pepper  → ______________________________ 
 
 
10. master/toss/finger  → ______________________________ 
 
 
11. blank/list/mate  → ______________________________ 
 
 
12. iron/shovel/engine  → ______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
STOP after 6 minutes! 
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Word integration task: Answer key        Performance table (threat condition) 
1. dust/cereal/fish → bowl       Top third 11-12 solved 
2. palm/shoe/house → tree       Middle third 9-10 solved 
3. wheel/hand/shopping → cart       Bottom third 0-8 solved 
4. mill/tooth/dust → saw         
5. fly/clip/wall → paper         
6. wagon/break/radio → station         
7. dress/dial/flower → sun       (control condition)  
8. animal/back/rat → pack       Top third 11-12 solved 
9. house/thumb/pepper   → green       Middle third 9-10 solved 
10. master/toss/finger → ring       Bottom third 0-8 solved 
11. blank/list/mate → check         
12. iron/shovel/engine → steam         
 
 
 
Above is the answer key to the word integration task you just completed. Please go back to 
your answers and report below the exact number of correct answers you had. 
 
→ I had ______ correct answers. 
 
 
 
Please refer to the performance table above and indicate which performance group you 
belong to based on the number of correct answers you had. (check one) 
 
→ My performance places me in the  ___  Top third  
     ___  Middle third 
     ___  Bottom third 
 
 
 
Circle one number on the scale below to indicate how difficult you found this word 
integration task.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all extremely
difficult difficult  
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Appendix 4: Heatherton & Polivy‟s (1991) scale of state self-esteem (study 3) 
 
Instructions: The next few questions intend to measure what you are thinking at this moment. 
There is, of course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is 
true of yourself at this moment. Be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain 
of the best answer. Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all A little bit Somewhat Very much Extremely 
 
 
 
  
Enter 
a number 
here 
1 I feel confident about my abilities.  
2 I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance.   
3 I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read.   
4 I feel as smart as others.  
5 I feel confident that I understand things.  
6 I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others.  
7 I feel like I'm not doing well.  
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Appendix 5: Self-affirmation procedure – No self-affirmation condition (study 3) 
 
Memory study: This study is interested in how well people can remember events of their 
personal lives. 
 
Part I: Ranking of Personal Characteristics and Values 
 
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, some of 
which may be unimportant. Please rank these values and qualities in order of importance to 
you, from 1 to 11 (1 = most important, 11 = least important). Make sure to use each number 
only once! 
 
 
___ Artistic skills/aesthetic appreciation  
___ Sense of humor 
___ Relations with friends/family 
___ Spontaneity/living life in the moment 
___ Social skills 
___ Athletics 
___ Music al ability/appreciation 
___ Physical attractiveness 
___ Creativity 
___ Business/managerial skills 
___ Romantic values 
 
 
Part II: Short essay 
 
In the space provided below, please explain why your 9
th
 ranked value might be important to 
someone else, and describe in detail one instance where expressing or acting on this 
particular value may cause someone else to feel good about themselves. As you describe this 
experience, make sure to reflect on why this experience may provide someone else with 
personal satisfaction. Your essay should be 50 to 100 words long.  
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Appendix 6: Self-affirmation procedure –Self-affirmation condition (study 3) 
 
Memory study: This study is interested in how well people can remember events of their 
personal lives. 
 
Part I: Ranking of Personal Characteristics and Values 
 
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, some of 
which may be unimportant. Please rank these values and qualities in order of importance to 
you, from 1 to 11 (1 = most important, 11 = least important). Make sure to use each number 
only once! 
 
 
___ Artistic skills/aesthetic appreciation  
___ Sense of humor 
___ Relations with friends/family 
___ Spontaneity/living life in the moment 
___ Social skills 
___ Athletics 
___ Music al ability/appreciation 
___ Physical attractiveness 
___ Creativity 
___ Business/managerial skills 
___ Romantic values 
 
 
Part II: Short essay 
 
In the space provided below, please explain why your 1
st
 ranked value is important to you, 
and recall in detail one instance where expressing or acting on this particular value has 
caused you to feel good about yourself. As you describe this experience, make sure to reflect 
on why this experience provides you with personal satisfaction. Your essay should be 50 to 
100 words long.  
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Appendix 7: Robins et al.‟s (2001) measure of state self-esteem (study 3) 
 
Instructions:  Circle one number on the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree 
or disagree with the following statement:  
 
 
 
 
I feel I have high self-esteem right now.  
 
1 2 3 4 5
not very true of me very true of me  
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Appendix 8: Picture study - Threat condition for women (study 4) 
 
Picture study 
 
Instructions: We selected pictures of college students from a popular website and pasted 
them thereafter. Please review this assortment of photographs and indicate for each picture 
how attractive the person is compared to you. Please try to be as accurate as possible. Using a 
“third person” approach may help. For instance, if someone other than you were to judge 
your attractiveness vs. that of the person depicted, what would they say?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Go to the next page. 
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Picture 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to this person, I am… (circle one number) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
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Picture 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to this person, I am… (circle one number) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
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Picture 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to this person, I am… (circle one number) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
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Picture 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to this person, I am… (circle one number) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
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Picture 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to this person, I am… (circle one number) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
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Demographics:  
 
 
 
Circle your gender:   Female   Male 
 
 
Age:  ___________ 
 
 
Overall, that is without specific comparison, how attractive would you say you are?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you. You can now proceed to the next study.  
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Appendix 9: Picture study - Threat condition for men (study 4) 
 
Picture study 
 
Instructions: We selected pictures of college students from a popular website and pasted 
them thereafter. Please review this assortment of photographs and indicate for each picture 
how attractive the person is compared to you. Please try to be as accurate as possible. Using a 
“third person” approach may help. For instance, if someone other than you were to judge 
your attractiveness vs. that of the person depicted, what would they say?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Go to the next page. 
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Picture 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to this person, I am… (circle one number) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
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Picture 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to this person, I am… (circle one number) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
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Picture 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to this person, I am… (circle one number) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
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Picture 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to this person, I am… (circle one number) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
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Picture 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to this person, I am… (circle one number) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
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Demographics:  
 
 
 
Circle your gender:   Female   Male 
 
 
Age:  ___________ 
 
 
Overall, that is without specific comparison, how attractive would you say you are?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Very
attractive attractive
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you. You can now proceed to the next study.  
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Appendix 10: PANAS scale (study 4) 
 
Instructions: This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.  Use 
the following scale to record your answers. 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 very slightly a little moderately quite a bit extremely 
 or not at all 
 
 
___ interested ___ irritable 
 
___ distressed ___ alert 
 
___ excited ___ ashamed 
 
___ upset ___ inspired 
 
___ strong ___ nervous 
 
___ guilty ___ determined 
 
___ scared ___ attentive 
 
___ hostile ___ jittery 
 
___ enthusiastic ___ active 
 
___ proud      ___ afraid 
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Appendix 11: Contingencies of self-worth scale by Crocker et al. (2003; study 4) 
 
Instructions: Please respond to each of the following statements by circling your answer 
using the scale from "1 = Strongly disagree" to "7 = Strongly agree." If you haven't 
experienced the situation described in a particular statement, please answer how you think 
you would feel if that situation occurred. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Neutral 
Agree 
somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
  
Enter a 
number 
here 
1 When I think I look attractive, I feel good about myself.  
2 My self-worth is based on God's love.  
3 I feel worthwhile when I perform better than others on a task or skill.  
4 My self-esteem is unrelated to how I feel about the way my body looks.  
5 Doing something I know is wrong makes me lose my self-respect.  
6 I don't care if other people have a negative opinion about me.  
7 
Knowing that my family members love me makes me feel good about 
myself. 
 
8 I feel worthwhile when I have God's love.  
9 I can't respect myself if others don't respect me.  
10 
My self-worth is not influenced by the quality of my relationships with my 
family members. 
 
11 
Whenever I follow my moral principles, my sense of self-respect gets a 
boost. 
 
12 Knowing that I am better than others on a task raises my self-esteem.  
13 My opinion about myself isn't tied to how well I do in school.  
14 I couldn't respect myself if I didn't live up to a moral code.  
15 I don't care what other people think of me.  
16 
When my family members are proud of me, my sense of self-worth 
increases. 
 
17 
My self-esteem is influenced by how attractive I think my face or facial 
features are. 
 
18 My self-esteem would suffer if I didn't have God's love.  
19 Doing well in school gives me a sense of self-respect.  
20 Doing better than others gives me a sense of self-respect.  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Neutral 
Agree 
somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
 
 
  
Enter a 
number 
here 
21 My sense of self-worth suffers whenever I think I don't look good.  
22 I feel better about myself when I know I'm doing well academically.  
23 What others think of me has no effect on what I think about myself.  
24 When I don't feel loved by my family, my self-esteem goes down.  
25 
My self-worth is affected by how well I do when I am competing with 
others. 
 
26 My self-esteem goes up when I feel that God loves me.  
27 My self-esteem is influenced by my academic performance.  
28 My self-esteem would suffer if I did something unethical.  
29 It is important to my self-respect that I have a family that cares about me.  
30 My self-esteem does not depend on whether or not I feel attractive.  
31 When I think that I'm disobeying God, I feel bad about myself.  
32 My self-worth is influenced by how well I do on competitive tasks.  
33 I feel bad about myself whenever my academic performance is lacking.  
34 
My self-esteem depends on whether or not I follow my moral/ethical 
principles. 
 
35 My self-esteem depends on the opinions others hold of me.  
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Appendix 12: Pictures in advertising – Control condition (follow-up study A) 
 
Instructions: Please take a moment to look at this picture and imagine in as much detail as 
possible what the life of this dog must be like. Next, in the space provided below, please 
reflect on your current feelings and attitudes as you contemplate this image.  
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
I imagine that the life of this animal is… 
 
Very unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very pleasant  
 
 
The sight of this picture is for me… 
 
Not at all entertaining 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very entertaining
Not at all disturbing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very disturbing
Not at all distressing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very distressing  
 
 
Overall, this picture makes me feel… 
 
Very sad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very happy
Very bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very good  
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Appendix 13: Pictures in advertising – Negative mood condition (follow-up study A) 
 
Please take a moment to look at this picture and imagine in as much detail as possible what 
the life of this dog must be like. Next, in the space provided below, please reflect on your 
current feelings and attitudes as you contemplate this image.  
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
I imagine that the life of this animal is… 
 
Very unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very pleasant  
 
 
The sight of this picture is for me… 
 
Not at all entertaining 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very entertaining
Not at all disturbing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very disturbing
Not at all distressing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very distressing  
 
 
Overall, this picture makes me feel… 
 
Very sad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very happy
Very bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very good  
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Appendix 14: Rosenberg‟s (1965) scale of state self-esteem (follow up study A) 
 
Instructions:  Circle the number under each item that most closely approximates how you feel 
about yourself right now, that is, at the present moment.  Circle only one number per item. 
 
 
1.  Right now I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others. 
 
not at all like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very much like me  
 
2.  Right now I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
 
not at all like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very much like me  
 
3.  Right now I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
 
not at all like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very much like me  
 
4.  Right now I feel that I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
 
not at all like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very much like me  
 
5.  Right now I feel that I do not have much to be proud of. 
 
not at all like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very much like me  
 
6.  Right now I have a positive attitude toward myself. 
 
not at all like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very much like me  
 
7.  Right now I am satisfied with myself. 
 
not at all like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very much like me  
 
8.  Right now I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
 
not at all like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very much like me  
 
9.  I certainly feel useless right now. 
 
not at all like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very much like me  
 
10.  Right now I think that I am no good at all. 
 
not at all like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very much like me  
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Appendix 15: Word Integration Task – Control condition (follow up study B) 
 
Word Integration Task 
 
Instructions:  Please direct your attention to the examples below. Each example offers 3 
stimulus words. The goal of this exercise is to generate a fourth word, which, when combined 
with each of the 3 stimulus words, would result in word pairs that are a common compound 
word or phrase. There can be only one correct answer per word problem. [Note: There is no 
time limit for this exercise, but please spend no more than 5-6 minutes on the task.] 
 
 
Example 1:  cottage/swiss/cake 
→ Answer: cheese as in cottage cheese, swiss cheese, cheese cake 
 
Example 2:  cream/skate/water 
→ Answer: ice as in ice cream, ice skate, ice water 
 
Example 3:  show/life/row 
→ Answer: boat as in boat show, life boat, row boat 
 
 
 
1. flake/mobile/cone  → ______________________________ 
 
2. safety/cushion/point  → ______________________________ 
 
3. fish/mine/rush  → ______________________________ 
 
4. high/district/house  → ______________________________ 
 
5. river/note/account  → ______________________________ 
 
6. print/berry/bird  → ______________________________ 
 
7. cadet/capsule/ship  → ______________________________ 
 
8. fur/rack/tail  → ______________________________ 
 
9. hound/pressure/shot  → ______________________________ 
 
10. basket/eight/snow  → ______________________________ 
 
 
Flip page over when ready to move on.  
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For how many word problems did you provide an answer?  
 
→ I provided an answer for ________ of the 10 problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
How many of your answers do you think are correct?  
 
→ I think that ________ of my answers are correct.  
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, how well do you think you did on this task? (circle a number) 
 
→ I think I did...  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very reasonably very
poorly well well  
 
 
 
 
 
If you were to guess, how does your performance fare against that of others? (check one) 
 
→ My performance places me in the  ___ Top third of respondents 
     ___ Middle third of respondents 
     ___ Bottom third of respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
How difficult did you find the task? (circle a number) 
 
→ I found the task… 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all extremely
difficult difficult  
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Appendix 16: Word Integration Task – Threat condition (follow up study B) 
 
Word Integration Task 
 
Instructions:  Please direct your attention to the examples below. Each example offers 3 
stimulus words. The goal of this exercise is to generate a fourth word, which, when combined 
with each of the 3 stimulus words, would result in word pairs that are a common compound 
word or phrase. There can be only one correct answer per word problem. [Note: There is no 
time limit for this exercise, but please spend no more than 5-6 minutes on the task.] 
 
 
Example 1:  cottage/swiss/cake 
→ Answer: cheese as in cottage cheese, swiss cheese, cheese cake 
 
Example 2:  cream/skate/water 
→ Answer: ice as in ice cream, ice skate, ice water 
 
Example 3:  show/life/row 
→ Answer: boat as in boat show, life boat, row boat 
 
 
 
1. shadow/chart/drop  → ______________________________ 
 
2. pet/bottom/garden  → ______________________________ 
 
3. artist/hatch/route  → ______________________________ 
 
4. control/place/rate  → ______________________________ 
 
5. nose/stone/bear  → ______________________________ 
 
6. child/scan/wash  → ______________________________ 
 
7. home/arm/room  → ______________________________ 
 
8. pea/shell/chest  → ______________________________ 
 
9. roll/bean/fish  → ______________________________ 
 
10. cry/front/ship  → ______________________________ 
 
 
Flip page over when ready to move on. 
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For how many word problems did you provide an answer?  
 
→ I provided an answer for ________ of the 10 problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
How many of your answers do you think are correct?  
 
→ I think that ________ of my answers are correct.  
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, how well do you think you did on this task? (circle a number) 
 
→ I think I did...  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very reasonably very
poorly well well  
 
 
 
 
 
If you were to guess, how does your performance fare against that of others? (check one) 
 
→ My performance places me in the  ___ Top third of respondents 
     ___ Middle third of respondents 
     ___ Bottom third of respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
How difficult did you find the task? (circle a number) 
 
→ I found the task… 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all extremely
difficult difficult  
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Appendix 17: Peterson & Sauber‟s (1983) mood short form (follow up study B) 
 
Instructions: For each statement below, please circle one number to indicate how much you 
agree or disagree with the statement. 
 
 
 
 
1) Currently, I am in a good mood.  
 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree  
 
 
 
 
2) As I answer these questions I feel cheerful. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree  
 
 
 
 
3) For some reason, I am not very comfortable right now. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree  
 
 
 
 
4) At this moment I feel edgy or irritable. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree  
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Appendix 18: Big Brothers Big Sisters Survey – Neutral condition (follow up study B) 
 
The Big Brothers Big Sisters Survey 
 
Instructions: This study intends to test a communication campaign by the Big Brothers Big 
Sisters foundation. Please read the communication on the next page carefully.  
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Big Brothers Big Sisters is the oldest, largest and most effective youth mentoring 
organization in the United States. We have been the leader in one-to-one youth service for 
more than a century, developing positive relationships that have a direct and lasting impact 
on the lives of young people. Big Brothers Big Sisters mentors children, ages 6 through 18, 
in communities across the country - including yours. 
 
The Big Brothers Big Sisters mission is to help children reach their potential through 
professionally supported, one-to-one relationships with mentors that have a measurable 
impact on youth. 
 
Our Mentoring Programs Work 
 
National research has shown that positive relationships between youth and their Big Brothers 
and Big Sisters mentors have a direct and measurable impact on children's lives. By 
participating in our youth mentoring programs, Little Brothers and Sisters are: 
 
 More confident in their schoolwork performance 
 Able to get along better with their families 
 46% less likely to begin using illegal drugs 
 27% less likely to begin using alcohol 
 52% less likely to skip school. 
 
 
You, too, can make a difference. Please donate either time or money to help us reach more 
children in need. Both means of assistance are just as precious to us. Thank you. 
76 
 
Instructions: Imagine that you were to commit help to the Big Brothers Big Sisters 
foundation either in the form of money or time. Knowing that both options below are equally 
valuable to the foundation, what would you personally prefer to do? (check one box below to 
indicate your relative preference) 
 
 
 
Option A: Donate $10.  
Option B: Donate 8 hours of my time collating fundraising materials and stuffing envelopes.  
 
 
 
 I would prefer to donate… 
money time
(i.e., Option A) (i.e., Option B)
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Using the scale below, please indicate… 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all very  
 
 
 
 
… how enriching would you find it to: 
 
Enter 
Number 
here 
Collate fundraising materials and stuff envelopes   
Design & type fundraising letters   
Develop study packets (e.g., create vocabulary lists, outline textbook chapters)  
Make a monetary donation  
Recruit other volunteers  
Solicit donations from potential donors  
Tutor a teenager  
Update a database with names of potential donors  
 
 
 
 
… how fulfilling would you find it to: 
 
Enter 
Number 
here 
Collate fundraising materials and stuff envelopes   
Design & type fundraising letters   
Develop study packets (e.g., create vocabulary lists, outline textbook chapters)  
Make a monetary donation  
Recruit other volunteers  
Solicit donations from potential donors  
Tutor a teenager  
Update a database with names of potential donors  
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Recall of the scale: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all very  
 
 
 
 
… how rewarding would you find it to: 
 
Enter 
Number 
here 
Collate fundraising materials and stuff envelopes   
Design & type fundraising letters   
Develop study packets (e.g., create vocabulary lists, outline textbook chapters)  
Make a monetary donation  
Recruit other volunteers  
Solicit donations from potential donors  
Tutor a teenager  
Update a database with names of potential donors  
 
 
 
 
… how satisfying would you find it to: 
 
Enter 
Number 
here 
Collate fundraising materials and stuff envelopes   
Design & type fundraising letters   
Develop study packets (e.g., create vocabulary lists, outline textbook chapters)  
Make a monetary donation  
Recruit other volunteers  
Solicit donations from potential donors  
Tutor a teenager  
Update a database with names of potential donors  
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Recall of the scale: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all very  
 
 
 
 
… how uplifting would you find it to: 
 
Enter 
Number 
here 
Collate fundraising materials and stuff envelopes   
Design & type fundraising letters   
Develop study packets (e.g., create vocabulary lists, outline textbook chapters)  
Make a monetary donation  
Recruit other volunteers  
Solicit donations from potential donors  
Tutor a teenager  
Update a database with names of potential donors  
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Appendix 19: Big Brothers Big Sisters Survey – Repair condition (follow up study B) 
 
The Big Brothers Big Sisters Survey 
 
Instructions: This study intends to test a communication campaign by the Big Brothers Big 
Sisters foundation. Please read the communication on the next page carefully.  
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Big Brothers Big Sisters is the oldest, largest and most effective youth mentoring 
organization in the United States. We have been the leader in one-to-one youth service for 
more than a century, developing positive relationships that have a direct and lasting impact 
on the lives of young people. Big Brothers Big Sisters mentors children, ages 6 through 18, 
in communities across the country - including yours. 
 
The Big Brothers Big Sisters mission is to help children reach their potential through 
professionally supported, one-to-one relationships with mentors that have a measurable 
impact on youth. 
 
Our Mentoring Programs Work 
 
National research has shown that positive relationships between youth and their Big Brothers 
and Big Sisters mentors have a direct and measurable impact on children's lives. By 
participating in our youth mentoring programs, Little Brothers and Sisters are: 
 
 More confident in their schoolwork performance 
 Able to get along better with their families 
 46% less likely to begin using illegal drugs 
 27% less likely to begin using alcohol 
 52% less likely to skip school. 
 
 
You, too, can make a difference. Please donate either time or money to help us reach more 
children in need. Both means of assistance are just as precious to us. Thank you. 
82 
 
Instructions: Imagine that you were to commit help to the Big Brothers Big Sisters 
foundation either in the form of money or time. Knowing that both options below are equally 
valuable to the foundation, what would you personally prefer to do? (check one box below to 
indicate your relative preference) 
 
 
 
Option A: Donate $10.  
Option B: Donate 8 hours of my time tutoring children with homework.  
 
 
 
 I would prefer to donate… 
money time
(i.e., Option A) (i.e., Option B)
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Using the scale below, please indicate… 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all very  
 
 
 
 
… how enriching would you find it to: 
 
Enter 
Number 
here 
Collate fundraising materials and stuff envelopes   
Design & type fundraising letters   
Develop study packets (e.g., create vocabulary lists, outline textbook chapters)  
Make a monetary donation  
Recruit other volunteers  
Solicit donations from potential donors  
Tutor a teenager  
Update a database with names of potential donors  
 
 
 
 
… how fulfilling would you find it to: 
 
Enter 
Number 
here 
Collate fundraising materials and stuff envelopes   
Design & type fundraising letters   
Develop study packets (e.g., create vocabulary lists, outline textbook chapters)  
Make a monetary donation  
Recruit other volunteers  
Solicit donations from potential donors  
Tutor a teenager  
Update a database with names of potential donors  
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Recall of the scale: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all very  
 
 
 
 
… how rewarding would you find it to: 
 
Enter 
Number 
here 
Collate fundraising materials and stuff envelopes   
Design & type fundraising letters   
Develop study packets (e.g., create vocabulary lists, outline textbook chapters)  
Make a monetary donation  
Recruit other volunteers  
Solicit donations from potential donors  
Tutor a teenager  
Update a database with names of potential donors  
 
 
 
 
… how satisfying would you find it to: 
 
Enter 
Number 
here 
Collate fundraising materials and stuff envelopes   
Design & type fundraising letters   
Develop study packets (e.g., create vocabulary lists, outline textbook chapters)  
Make a monetary donation  
Recruit other volunteers  
Solicit donations from potential donors  
Tutor a teenager  
Update a database with names of potential donors  
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Recall of the scale: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all very  
 
 
 
 
… how uplifting would you find it to: 
 
Enter 
Number 
here 
Collate fundraising materials and stuff envelopes   
Design & type fundraising letters   
Develop study packets (e.g., create vocabulary lists, outline textbook chapters)  
Make a monetary donation  
Recruit other volunteers  
Solicit donations from potential donors  
Tutor a teenager  
Update a database with names of potential donors  
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